tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post5304443163351194701..comments2023-08-23T06:09:56.304-07:00Comments on Election 2010: The Alternative Vote, why bother?The School of Politics and International Relations.http://www.blogger.com/profile/06499387045947989393noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-42677282889644625572010-05-13T01:56:42.198-07:002010-05-13T01:56:42.198-07:00Reply to some of the comments
Thanks to all who ...Reply to some of the comments <br /><br />Thanks to all who have commented.<br /><br />Delbert Wilkins comment is spot on: one of the key questions is how we want to be represented. The basic choice here is between on the one hand representation of localities and, on the other of party preferences as they exist in the country as a whole. Local representation in its extreme form requires single member constituencies. Representation of party preferences in the country leads to PR with the entire country acting as a single constituency (as exists in, e.g., the Netherlands and Israel). But there are many options in between these two extremes, which either involve mult-member constituencies, or some form of mixed representation. I will discuss these in a separate blog post. The question which of these options is actually preferred by most people can only be answered by surveys (or referendums). <br /><br />Peter Conlon suggests some criteria that should be realised by an electoral system. These are sensible, but there are many more that one can think of (see for more extensive discussion of all such kinds of criteria Colomer, Josep M. (2004). Handbook of Electoral System Choice. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan; and <br />Farrell, David M. (2001). Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press.) Maybe a topic for another blog post, later (just as Anonymous' request for a simple explanation of Arrow's paradox).<br /><br />Russell Heiling's suggestion to eliminate candidates in AV not on numbers of smallest number of 1st preferences but on highest mean ranking is excellent and would solve some of the problems of the more common form of AV. Of course, it does make a strong assumption, namely that the ranks of preferences are the same as the strengths of those preferences, as it would not make sense otherwise to calculate a mean. As an example: if strength of preference (referred to by economists as 'utility') could be measured on a scale of, say, 0 to 10, then 3 voters could have the following preferences :<br />Chris: 100, Harriet: 69, William: 68<br />Chris: 100, Harriet: 0, William: 70<br />Chris: 100, Harriet: 3, William: 0.<br />Who is least preferred? Russell would suggest William, as he ranks 3, 2, 3, while Harriet ranks 2, 3 and 2. Yet, in terms of strengths of preferences William (average 46) is clearly preferred over Harriet (averages 23). <br />This example is not meant to belittle Russell's creative suggestion, but to highlight its implicit assumptions.<br /><br />Anonymous' comment on tactical voting is another insightful one. Yet, AV is not immune aginst tactical voting (albeit under different circumstances than sketched in this comment).<br /><br />Thanks to all! Without doubt we'll see more posts on electoral reform inthe future.Cees van der Eijknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-39599115228102915852010-05-12T17:38:32.802-07:002010-05-12T17:38:32.802-07:00There is also French (cough! cough!) ballotage sys...There is also French (cough! cough!) ballotage system. If any candidate get more than 50%, the first two candidates face each other again. With just two candidates, the winner will always have more than 50%.<br /><br />In order to avoid two elections, the AV option could work as a "ballotage", instead of eliminating the last, eliminate all but the first two.<br /><br />P.S.: Don't forget that what matters in the first count is the main vote. What really matter in your example is that 75% didn't want Chris as their first option.Sanchonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-84325081177459330022010-05-11T16:24:15.988-07:002010-05-11T16:24:15.988-07:00As Lloyd George said: There is nothing more danger...As Lloyd George said: There is nothing more dangerous than to leap a chasm in two jumpscorporealnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-51359914002585027722010-05-11T15:12:39.487-07:002010-05-11T15:12:39.487-07:00You mention the advantage of AV that it ensures th...You mention the advantage of AV that it ensures the elected candidate has some support of over 50% of the electorate, and (I think rightly) state that it's a goal that few are worried about.<br /><br />However the other problem it goes a long way to address is that of the need for tactical voting*. Let's take as an example of real political parties, and assume that we can rank them from left to right as Green, Labour, Lib Dems, Conservative, UKIP, BNP. Assuming a constituency that is viewed to be a Labour/Conservative battleground, then tactical voting would call for Greens to fall in behind Labour and BNP/UKIP supporters to vote Conservatives, with Lib Dems individually deciding whether they'd rather nudge a bit to the left or to the right. Under AV, Greens can vote Greens 1, Labour 2, Lib Dem 3; BNP supporters can vote BNP 1, UKIP 2, Conservative 3... and so on - each voter can honestly express their preference, with a reasonable expectation that their vote will end up helping someone they favour over someone they don't.<br /><br />* I appreciate that AV doesn't completely prevent tactical voting, but it does help a lot.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-15457540372521477872010-05-11T14:26:00.518-07:002010-05-11T14:26:00.518-07:00I think it is also important that a voting system ...I think it is also important that a voting system should lead to the same result no matter which order the votes are counted. STV can vary greatly in result depending on the order the votes are counted.Russell Heillinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05879820110587145711noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-54838483268669621122010-05-11T14:22:36.380-07:002010-05-11T14:22:36.380-07:00I think a (relatively) simple change to AV that ma...I think a (relatively) simple change to AV that makes it much fairer is to eliminate the candidate with the highest mean ranking rather than the candidate with the lowest count of 1st rankings.<br /><br />In this example the mean rankings would be:<br /><br />Chris: 25% @ 1, 75% @ 2 (mean 1.75)<br />William: 35% @ 1, 25% @ 2, 40% @ 3 (mean 2.05)<br />Harriet: 40% @ 1, 60% @ 3 (mean 2.2)<br /><br />Leading to Harriet being eliminated in the first round rather than Chris.<br /><br />When the 40% of preference 2 votes from Harriet is added to Chris's 25%, Chris wins with the support of 65% of voters.Russell Heillinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05879820110587145711noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-60889213881056422702010-05-11T12:18:03.226-07:002010-05-11T12:18:03.226-07:00Chaps,
A useful post would be a practical (ie jou...Chaps,<br /><br />A useful post would be a practical (ie journo's) summary of Arrow's paradox, and an explanation of how any voting system is inconsistent in some sense. A lot of the debate about voting systems at the moment is predicated on the notion that there is a perfect voting system, not on the trade-offs that are made in any particular system. And bum up approval voting a bit, it deserves it: it's the simplest adaption of the current system but is substantially fairer. It also addresses the argument that votes for losers in safe seats are wasted.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-8623280172105850562010-05-11T10:34:39.787-07:002010-05-11T10:34:39.787-07:00Suppose I have an election between candidates (A,B...Suppose I have an election between candidates (A,B,C,D) and the voting system (VS), say, elects B. In my opinion a good VS should satisfy these counter-factual conditions:<br />* If any candidate apart from B had decided not to stand, then B would still have won.<br />* If an additional candidate, E, had also decided to stand, then the VS could have elected only B or E.<br /><br />FPTP fails both of these consistency tests, whereas AV passes. I think the answer to "why bother with AV?" is that FPTP is so absolutely dreadful.Peter Conlonhttp://www-thphys.physics.ox.ac.uk/people/PeterConlon/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5612670157201289832.post-6028338510240351432010-05-11T10:24:51.324-07:002010-05-11T10:24:51.324-07:00You touch on the question that no-one (let alone t...You touch on the question that no-one (let alone the shrill proponents of PR) is apparently asking - how do we want to be represented? It has nothing to do with which party would benefit and everything to do with how we want our interests to be represented in Parliament. If we choose to retain a single-member constituency link (which I suspect (but don't know for sure) that most people would want) then PR is simply not applicable. If anything, it is those in favour of PR who are acting on narrow party interest, not those who oppose it. <br /><br />This whole debate has been fatuous in the extreme.Delbert Wilkinsnoreply@blogger.com